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The Evaluating Judges conference held in October 2009 was the 
second in a series of conferences planned at Duke Law School in which 
judges and academics came together to discuss questions relating to 
research on judges.1 As two academics who study judges, we find these 
opportunities to interact with judges valuable. On occasion, the 
interactions can be tense—such as when the judges tell us why they 
think our work is fundamentally flawed, and we try to respond by 
pointing to data that seem to contradict their arguments, and they 
assert that the data are biased and so on. This recent conference was 
not lacking in tension, but it was different in that it did not follow the 
typical format of involving judges or other practitioners in academic 
work. Under that format, academics present research papers, and then 
judges or other practitioners provide commentary. At this conference, 
by contrast, the judges took the lead role, identifying and discussing the 
topics they thought were most relevant to research on evaluating 
judicial behavior. To be sure, part of the conference still involved the 
judges telling the academics, and particularly the empiricists, that they 
were headed in the wrong directions and that judging was an “art” and 
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not amenable to measurement.2 But the judges also talked about what 
they thought was important and what kind of information they might 
consider important in evaluating themselves or their fellow judges. It 
is the latter set of conversations that we focus on here. 
The observations we report on are from two days of conversations 
between judges and academics, both at the formal sessions and 
informally during breaks and at meals. We combine those with similar 
observations from the one-day conference on Measuring Judges held a 
year ago at Duke. (The earlier conference followed the more typical 
format, with empiricists presenting research and judges commenting.) 
What we report here are no more than subjective impressions. For 
reasons of confidentiality, we provide no identifying information on 
the sources of our observations. Instead, we paint some general themes 
with a broad brush. Our reason for reporting on these themes is that 
there are ideas here about studying judges that would not have 
occurred to us but for the opportunity to talk to judges themselves. 
Hopefully, other researchers will find these ideas as interesting as we 
did. 
I.  WHAT JUDGES DISLIKE 
It was clear that the judges dislike being measured and ranked by 
academics who do not understand anything about what qualities make 
for a truly great judge. The first couple of sessions of the conference, 
therefore, featured a number of the judges talking about how the 
measures used by academics to evaluate them were bogus. For 
example, many of the judges found using citation counts to measure 
the quality of judicial decisions particularly problematic. According to 
some, citation counts are flawed because they measure judicial 
expansiveness, rather than careful and narrow fact-driven analysis. 
Also annoying, according to some of the judges, are attempts to 
measure independence using the degree of disagreement among 
judges. Judicial independence is often measured by how often judges 
dissent, particularly against those from the same party. This is not 
judicial independence, as these judges saw it: rather, dissenting is more 
akin to cantankerousness—at best, it is indulgent; at worst, it 
undermines collegiality.3 
 
 2. To which we might ask, “Aren’t there market prices for art?” 
 3. The contrast between the uses that researchers make of dissents and the distaste that 
many of the judges appear to have for it is the focus of Joanna Shepherd’s paper for this 
Workshop. See Joanna Shepherd, Diversity, Tenure, and Dissent, LEGAL WORKSHOP (DUKE L.J., 
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Fair enough. The point, at first cut, appeared to be that academics 
like us were drawing the wrong inferences from the data. Instead of 
concluding that the judges with the most citations were the most 
influential (and thus the “best”), we should have been saying that they 
were likely the most expansive (and thus the “worst”). And instead of 
using the term “independence” for the measure of dissents, perhaps we 
should have been using the terms “disagreeable” or “uncollegial.” 
Indeed, these are questions that can probably be tested against 
other measures. One could look at the opinions cited more frequently 
and examine whether they are more expansive than the ones cited less 
(assuming one could come up with a measure for expansiveness4). If it 
turned out that this were the case, we asked the judges, would they be 
willing to look at citation rates as a measure of bad judicial 
performance? Their response was that we were still missing the point. 
The point was not that citation rates showed low-quality judging rather 
than high-quality judging, but that they showed nothing. It would be as 
if we had taken data on sunspots and used that to evaluate judges. The 
bottom line for some of the judges (not all) seemed to be that no data 
is better than the type of data that many academics were using.5 
Further, they seemed deeply skeptical of the ability academics to ever 
come up with objective measures of judicial performance, given the 
complexity of the job.6 From their perspective, such reductionist 
research is demeaning to the judges and undermines the system as a 
whole. 
Lastly, there was concern expressed that some judges might focus 
unduly on trying to do well in the academics’ rankings. That is, they 
might focus their efforts on publishing opinions, dissenting against co-
partisans, and obtaining citations instead of on the important aspects 
of the job—which, at the district level, is mostly about case 
management. We have to confess that the idea that judges would pay 
even the slightest bit of attention to a ranking by some academics, let 
alone that it might affect their behavior, was more than a bit surprising. 
 
Feb. 25, 2010). 
 4. We probably should have asked the judges to define more precisely what they meant by 
expansiveness; our guess is that it is the converse of deciding a case narrowly. And narrow 
decisionmaking, where the judge addresses as few issues as possible, appears to be viewed by 
many as a virtue. The theoretical basis for the assertion that narrow decisionmaking is necessarily 
optimal is not, however, clear to us.  
 5. The words “garbage in, garbage out” came up. 
 6. This complexity point befuddles us. Are academics really supposed to avoid measuring 
certain phenomena because they are complex?  
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After all, a number of the judges also seemed to be of the view that 
academics these days produce little scholarship of value to the 
judiciary. 
That said, assuming some judges did care about these rankings, it 
is not clear that this is a bad thing. To do well on the rankings, judges 
would have to act in a less partisan fashion (by being willing to disagree 
with co-partisans), write more publishable-quality opinions, and write 
opinions that others would wish to use to construct their own 
arguments (to garner more citations). If judges did modify their 
behavior at the margins to do better in these areas, would that be a bad 
thing? The point that these may not be characteristics that are valuable 
at the trial level is valid. But the response to that is simply that the 
ranking of district judges should focus more on case-management 
techniques. 
There is a bigger point here, though, which is that if judges really 
do pay attention to academic attempts to rank them, these rankings can 
be a means to incentivize judges. And incentivizing judges, particularly 
those with life appointments, has always been a difficult problem. 
Better rankings will presumably produce better incentives. If so, the 
goal should be to produce better rankings. At the end of the day, 
though, we are not persuaded that judges pay much attention to 
academic rankings. (There are numbers to which they do pay attention: 
reversal rates. But more on that later.) 
Despite their hostility toward academic attempts to measure judge 
and court performance, the judges were willing to talk about what 
constituted good judging. Although this was by no means a uniform 
sentiment, judges appear to value politeness. What is important is 
showing the appropriate amounts of respect for lawyers, fellow judges, 
and judges at lower levels of the hierarchy. Assuming that politeness is 
important, one question is how to measure it. During a coffee break, 
one judge suggested that empiricists might look at the frequency of the 
use of certain words—he suggested “frivolous,” among others—that 
indicated disrespect of the lower courts or the lawyers involved in the 
case. 
The bigger question, though, was whether having strong norms of 
politeness actually benefited the system of justice.7 One answer was 
that strong norms of politeness promote deliberation and discussion. 
The term that kept coming up in connection with these ideas was 
 
 7. Dissents, we suspect, are not considered particularly polite, especially when a judge 
dissents a lot. 
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“collegiality.”8 But do we know whether politeness, particularly of the 
superficial variety, promotes deliberation and discussion? If judges 
have to constrain their comments to satisfy the norms of politeness, 
does that not hurt deliberation? Given the evidence on how easily 
homogeneous groups can descend into groupthink, is it not important 
to ensure that there are disruptive elements?9 We do not have answers 
to these questions, but they struck us as ones worth pursuing. 
As the discussion of the value of deliberation progressed, an issue 
that we found interesting was the degree to which deliberation among 
judges, particularly at the appellate level, takes place via highly 
formalized routines. In some courts, for example, the norm is that 
judges who are collaborating on an opinion for a case do not simply 
call each other up and chat about issues with which they might be 
struggling. Instead, communication is often highly structured and 
limited to written correspondence. The primary writer of the draft will 
produce a document and then circulate a copy. The other judges on the 
panel are not allowed, by norm, to edit that document—not even with 
track-changes or comment functions. Instead, they respond via 
memoranda that typically follow a fixed format. 
In other courts, there are formal rules about who gets to speak and 
when they get to speak during judicial conferences (the meetings at 
which judges discuss the case after hearing it). Often, the rule is that 
the judges speak in order of seniority, and when they speak they also 
announce their vote. Furthermore, there may be implicit rules about 
what kinds of things judges are allowed to say and whether it is 
acceptable to have debate. For example, is it okay to ask the other 
judge what his reasons for coming to his decision are? Is it okay to 
challenge those decisions at the conference? (As best we can tell, the 
answer is “no” to both of these questions.) 
The foregoing raised the question of whether the formal rules that 
structure judicial conversation and communication (assuming that they 
 
 8. Collegiality, what value it brings on the judiciary, and what it means, are also the subject 
of the recent exchange between Judge Harry Edwards and Judge Richard Posner. See Harry T. 
Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the 
Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1949–52 (2009) (highlighting the 
benefits of judicial deliberation and collegiality); Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: 
A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177 (2010) (expressing skepticism regarding 
Judge Edwards’ claims regarding deliberation and collegiality, given the realities of how judges 
communicate). 
 9. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 168–90, 209–13 (2003) 
(arguing that organizations, including courts, are likely to perform better if they promote dissent). 
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are widespread) help or harm deliberation on collegial courts. A couple 
of the female participants pointed out that it was possible that this 
formality would stifle active deliberation and unduly constrain 
outsiders to the system (such as women and racial minorities). There 
is, after all, a growing literature about the need to diversify the 
judiciary so as to get a broader range of perspectives. But, given that 
there are relatively small numbers of racial minorities and women on 
the courts (more of the latter than the former), the only way to have 
their perspectives heard, we suspect, is to have more deliberation. In 
other words, at least with respect to diversity, we should want more 
disagreement and less collegiality.10 
One of the most important features of the justification for 
deliberation as a way of enhancing collective decisionmaking is the 
purported benefit of having a wide range of opinions in the 
decisionmaking process. According to this argument, we need an 
institutional setting that maximizes the opportunities for these diverse 
perspectives to participate in the process to realize these beneficial 
effects. Our discussion raised a basic question: will the purported 
beneficial effects of diverse perspectives emerge within these 
conversations’ highly constrained structures? 
Now, it was not clear to us that the judges themselves were 
attached to or particularly fond of these constraints on conversation. 
One cynical judge with whom we discussed this question at a 
subsequent conference asked whether it really made much of a 
difference, for example, to say “I respectfully dissent” instead of “I 
dissent” when the substance of the dissent was to say “Your opinion is 
completely and utterly wrong.” Plus, if everyone understands that “I 
respectfully dissent” does not signal any respect, who cares? 
Finally, neither judges nor academics appeared to have any sense 
of how much variation there was across courts in these rules of 
communication, let alone whether they had a meaningful impact on the 
quality of deliberation (and ultimately, the quality of dispute 
 
 10. Along these lines, scholars have examined whether increased levels of gender diversity 
correlate with higher levels of dissent and slower decisionmaking. Even assuming that that is the 
case, neither finding should be necessarily dismaying, because one of the values of greater 
diversity is that there will be a greater range of perspectives and more discussion will be required 
to reach decisions. See Shepherd, supra note 3 (finding that higher levels of diversity among state 
supreme courts is associated with higher levels of dissent); John Szmer, Robert K. Christensen & 
Elizabeth Wemlinger, Diversity, Conflict and Judicial Efficiency in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
(Feb. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ncpsa.net/papers/Szmer.John
.pdf (finding that although diversity among circuit courts leads to losses in judicial efficiency, those 
losses can be mitigated if circuit courts reach a certain level of diversity). 
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resolution). 
II.  REVERSAL RATES 
The most interesting parts of the workshop for us were the final 
two sessions, during which the judges raised the issue of using reversal 
rates to evaluate judges. The one statistic that a number of the judges 
appeared to be aware of was their number of reversals. (Further, at 
least some of the judges had detailed explanations for why the reversals 
had been unfair or unwarranted.) The academic empirical literature, 
by contrast, has not done a great deal with reversal rates.11 Part of the 
reason for this, we suspect, is the dominance of the political science 
perspective in this area of research. From that perspective, reversals 
are likely to be a function of political differences between the appeals 
courts and the lower courts. So, one would expect to see Republican 
appeals court judges reversing Democrat trial judges more often than 
they would reverse Republican trial judges. That is, unless Democrat 
trial judge recognize the preferences of the Republicans on the 
appellate court and adjust their behavior to please the judges on the 
court above. Either way, the point is that scholars who think of judges 
as strategic actors would be unlikely to use reversal rates as a measure 
of judicial merit. 
The fact that judges care about reversals, however, suggests that 
academics might wish to pay more attention to them. If judges dislike 
reversals, that suggests that they will take actions to avoid reversals. 
Further, to the extent some judges dislike reversals more than others, 
those different levels of reversal aversion should translate into 
different types of decisionmaking. A couple of the judges suggested 
that this reversal aversion might manifest itself in decisions at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage. Grants of motions to dismiss are subject to 
appellate review, the judges explained, but denials are not. That creates 
an incentive for reversal-averse judges to be, at the margins, more 
circumspect about granting dismissals. 
Another question that the discussion of reversals raised was what 
kinds of measures of reversals would be meaningful in assessing the 
 
 11. Exceptions include Frank Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1383, 1404–05 (2009), which notes that reversal rates are an important metric that may help 
measure judicial performance, and Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts 36–38 (Dec. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434742, which analyzes reversal rights among circuits and 
circuit court judges to determine levels of judicial activism. 
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quality of judicial decisionmaking. Should reversals by same-party 
appeals courts (Republican appeals panel reversing a Republican trial 
judge) be a clearer sign of error than reversals by opposite-party panels 
(Democrat panel reversing Republican trial judges)? The judges did 
not find our attempt to bring politics back into the discussion of 
reversal rates appealing, but we suspect that there is something there. 
One participant also raised the question of whether judges who have 
more citations (the ones who write expansively) are more likely to 
reverse lower court judges than those who have fewer citations. We do 
not know the answer to this question, but it makes sense that reversal 
rates would be correlated with high citations. If one believes that high 
citations are a sign of quality—a view with which the judges at the two 
conferences would disagree—then one would expect more reversals by 
appeals court judges with more citations. After all, they would be more 
likely to find errors in the lower court’s analyses. Conversely, oft-cited 
lower court judges should get reversed less. 
We should note here that the judges were not saying that 
academics should be ranking them based on their reversal rates. They 
would likely be horrified by that suggestion. Rather, our point is that 
judges pay attention to reversal rates.12 And even here, we should note 
that when we brought up the issue of reversal aversion in front of 
judges on occasions subsequent to the conference (when one of us has 
been presenting research based on the idea of reversal aversion), we 
have been told in no uncertain terms by our judge-commentators that 
judges care not a whit about reversals. (The caveat in that context was 
with respect to reversals done via summary order; apparently, that is 
the judicial equivalent of a slap in the face.) 
The discussion of reversal rates also led to the question of 
communication between trial and appeals court judges. Most of the 
academics at the conference knew little about how much 
communication occurred between the appeals court judges and the 
judges they were reversing. For example, was it customary for the 
appeals judges to call up the trial judges and explain the reason for 
reversal? Did the appeals judges periodically hold seminars to explain 
to the trial judges what kinds of errors the trial judges were making 
systematically? Once the topic of reversals came up, there was 
unending stream of questions and not enough time for answers. 
Suffice it to say, however, that we have embarked on collecting 
 
 12. One judge knew not only his reversal rate, but exactly how many times his cases had been 
appealed over the past few years. He did also say that he didn’t care about being reversed. 
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reversal rates. 
III.  SHOWING UP 
We finish with our observations on the contrasting behaviors of 
academics and judges in that most mundane of matters: showing up. 
Getting the judges to agree to attend was not easy. But once they had 
agreed to participate, they committed to the enterprise from beginning 
to end: the judges, at both this and the prior conference, sat patiently 
through almost all of the sessions. Many of our academic guests, by 
contrast, viewed attendance as optional. Once they had presented their 
papers or spoken their piece, the academics (probably including the 
two of us) were more likely to tune out, go for a walk, check email, text 
messages, and so on. As best we could tell, the judges also were more 
likely than the academics to have looked at the background materials 
for the conferences and done the reading. 
Relatedly, the judges seemed cognizant of the hierarchy within 
their group. And this hierarchy was a function of what level of court 
they sat on, rather than how knowledgeable or capable they were. 
Although the ground rules of the conference provided that participants 
were all at an equal level and were to refer to each other by first name, 
it would not have taken an external observer long to determine which 
judges were at which levels in the hierarchy. This is not to say that those 
at lower levels necessarily deferred to the views of those at higher 
levels, but there was a pecking order. Needless to say, academics have 
their own pecking order—few groups are more conscious of social 
status than law professors. If asked, the judges could probably have 
discerned a hierarchy among the academics as well. Our point simply 
is that the judges, at both our conferences, were very aware of relative 
positions within the formal hierarchy. That is, for example in the 
federal system, magistrate judges are below district court judges, who 
are below appeals court judges, and so on. 
Finally, judges are polite and proper in their interactions (at least, 
relative to the academics). The judges almost never interrupted the 
other participants. They raised their hands when they wished to speak 
and waited to be called on. The problem, though, was that the initial 
roundtable format of the conversation allowed participants to interject 
whenever they felt like talking, with the result that the academics 
tended to talk much more. After a couple of the initial sessions, during 
which the judges could barely get a word in, the format had to be 
changed so that a moderator would keep a queue of people who 
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wanted to speak and make sure that a handful of academics didn’t grab 
all the air time. 
These observations will strike some as trivial, but we find the 
mundane and trivial interesting. What we saw, albeit from the behavior 
of two small groups, made us wonder whether there was a story here 
worthy of further investigation. Are the people who choose to become 
judges also the types of people who respect hierarchy and like 
following rules, or do judges in the U.S. become socialized into certain 
patterns of rule-following behavior? Conversely, are people who 
choose to become academics perhaps those who dislike the constraints 
of formal rules? To the extent we find that rule-following is more 
prevalent among judges, that raises additional questions: do outsiders 
(women and racial minorities) who join the bench tend to violate the 
rules more or follow them more? More broadly, if the people who 
become judges are more inclined to be rule followers than those in the 
general population, does that say something about how laws are likely 
to evolve in conservative directions? 
CONCLUSION 
Our observations from these conferences have implications for 
three different areas of the study of law: explanations of judicial 
decisionmaking, assessments of the quality of judicial decisionmaking, 
and analyses of legal and democratic deliberation. 
In regard to issues of social scientific explanations of judicial 
decisionmaking, the discussions with judges suggest that there are two 
types of factors that may be worthy of greater attention than they 
presently receive in the literature. The first encompasses psychological 
factors such as temperament and concern with status. The aversion to 
reversal on appeal, for example, could significantly restrain the 
decisions of judges. If this aversion is as widespread as the discussions 
at these conferences suggested, then we would want to figure out how 
to incorporate it in a generalizable way into the explanations. The 
second encompasses group dynamic factors such as the concern with 
collegiality and the formal structure of deliberation. To the extent that 
such factors influence the common processes of interaction among 
judges, our explanations of collegial courts should take better note of 
them. 
In regard to assessments of judicial quality, these discussions 
challenge us to think harder about what constitutes a good measure of 
quality. The judges in our conferences think that academics who study 
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quality are misguided in their basic conceptualization of good judging. 
And they offer in response some insights into the image of the type of 
judge with whom they like to interact and the type of judge they would 
most like to be. In essence, they are offering us a criterion of quality 
from an internal perspective. Because we can reasonably assume that 
this self-image motivates, at least in part, their behavior on the bench, 
it would be a mistake for us to ignore their insights in our consideration 
of measurement questions. But the internal perspective alone is not 
enough for an adequate account of judicial quality. Academics who 
study quality bring a necessary external perspective to such an analysis. 
When effective, they can develop measures that reflect a criterion of 
quality based on the effect of judicial decisions on society writ large. 
Future assessments of judicial quality need to find a way to incorporate 
both perspectives. 
Finally, in regard to analyses of group deliberation, identifying the 
different rules of deliberation and communication among judges and 
analyzing those rules’ effects on decision quality are matters that both 
academics and judges should find interesting and relevant. One of the 
things that struck us about the discussions at the conference was the 
extent to which academics who study both legal and democratic 
deliberation may have overestimated the amount of deliberation that 
actually takes place in the judicial process. Juries and courts are two of 
the most common examples of group deliberation offered in this 
literature. But the idealized characterization of deliberation found in 
the studies is far different from the perspective that emerged from 
these conferences. Perhaps advocates of deliberation should take a 
new look at judicial deliberation to see what they might learn about 
what can and what cannot foster deliberation in group settings. And, 
at the same time, judges who are persuaded of the benefits of serious 
deliberation on collegial courts might take a moment to consider if 
their everyday practices actually foster or hinder such deliberation. 
